Quantitative Impact of Catastrophe Risk Insurance on Community Resilience by Lee, Ji Yun et al.
13th International Conference on Applications of Statistics and Probability in Civil Engineering, ICASP13 
Seoul, South Korea, May 26-30, 2019 
 1 
Quantitative Impact of Catastrophe Risk Insurance on Community 
Resilience  
Ji Yun Lee  
Assistant Professor, Dept. of Civil & Environmental Engineering, Washington State University, Pullman, 
WA, USA 
Jie Zhao  
Graduate Student, Dept. of Civil & Environmental Engineering, Washington State University, Pullman, 
WA, USA 
Yue Li  
Professor, Dept. of Civil Engineering, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH, USA 
Yue-Jun Yin 
Principal Engineer, AIR Worldwide, Boston, MA, USA  
ABSTRACT: Catastrophe risk insurance is an important risk management tool that reduces excessive 
financial burdens of homeowners following a disaster and expedites the recovery of disaster-impacted 
buildings and the community that they support. This paper proposes a quantitative framework for 
assessing the effects of catastrophe risk insurance on community resilience. The framework simulates 
pre- and post-disaster circumstances of a community by explicitly incorporating the characteristics of 
hazards and properties, individual homeowners’ financial availability and risk attitudes, and available 
insurance plans. A small residential community in Miami-Dade County, Florida, following a scenario 
hazard event (Hurricane Wilma) is used to test the feasibility of the proposed framework. The quantitative 
impact of insurance on community resilience will provide guidance on how catastrophe risk insurance 
can be used in a broad resilience planning to achieve its long-term resilience goals.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Catastrophe risk insurance is an important risk 
management tool to expedite the recovery of 
disaster-impacted buildings, critical civil 
infrastructure systems, and in turn, the 
communities that they support (Field et al., 2012; 
Kunreuther, 2015). In addition, property 
insurance helps policy holder transfer risk and 
avoid substantial financial burdens from 
repair/reconstruction activities following a hazard 
event (Kunreuther and Pauly, 2006). However, 
recent experiences indicate that many buildings 
and infrastructure systems are not sufficiently 
insured against natural disasters partly due to 
building owners’ lack of foresight or their limited 
financial availability (Vasiljevic et al., 2013).  
The role of catastrophe risk insurance in 
disaster risk management strategies has been well 
investigated in several studies. Kunreuther and 
Pauly (2006) pointed out the importance of 
mandatory comprehensive insurance in reducing 
significant expenditures following a disastrous 
event. Kunreuther (2008) also showed that the 
adoption of structural measures can be 
encouraged by insurance premium reduction (as 
an economic incentive), and both of them lead to 
significant reduction in catastrophe losses and 
excessive financial burdens induced by a disaster. 
However, most of these studies to date have 
assessed the role of catastrophe insurance in 
disaster risk management qualitatively rather than 
quantitatively.  
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In recent years, many studies have realized 
that catastrophe risk insurance may considerably 
shorten the recovery time and affect the 
restoration curve of a community following a 
disaster as it provides much more expedited 
payments to the insured properties compared to 
government assistance. HAZUS-MH (FEMA, 
2009) implicitly included the time to negotiate 
with insurance company in the building repair 
time and loss of function while the REDiTM 
framework (Almufti and Willford, 2013) 
explicitly developed the statistical models for the 
delay due to insurance payment and SBA-backed 
loans, assigning smaller median values on the 
former. Moreover, Miles and Chang (2007) 
incorporated the insurance status of homeowners 
in the model that simulates the recovery processes 
of communities following a disaster. Although the 
reduced delay time due to insurance is now well 
recognized in community resilience planning, 
most studies have made restrictive assumptions or 
utilized simple statistical information to model the 
insurance status of properties. While individual 
homeowner’s decision on insurance purchase is 
critical in community resilience modeling, the 
area of research is still in its infancy.  
This paper proposes a quantitative 
framework for assessing the impact of catastrophe 
risk insurance on community resilience by 
explicitly incorporating behaviors of individual 
homeowners. We begin by investigating the 
structure of the proposed framework which 
consists of two parts: pre-disaster individual-level 
decision model (Part I) and post-disaster 
community-level recovery model (Part II). Part I 
describes individual homeowners’ decisions on 
insurance coverage based on the maximum 
expected utility model. Part II models the 
recovery processes of individual buildings based 
on homeowners’ pre-disaster and post-disaster 
actions, and subsequently simulates the recovery 
process of a community. The proposed framework 
is applied to a small residential community 
located in Miami-Dade County, Florida to 
simulate the insurance coverage of each building 
prior to a disaster and its post-disaster recovery 
following a scenario hurricane. Finally, sensitivity 
analysis is performed to assess the effect of 
government assistance on the community 
recovery process.    
2. MODEL STRUCTURE  
This section illustrates the structure of the 
proposed framework that quantitatively assesses 
the impact of catastrophe risk insurance on 
community resilience. The proposed framework 
consists of two sequentially linked parts: pre-
disaster individual-level decision model (Part I) 
and post-disaster community-level recovery 
model (Part II). In Part I, individual homeowners 
decide what insurance coverage might be optimal 
based on their locations, building types, financial 
availability, and risk perception. Insurance 
coverage of each household (the result from Part 
I) determines the delay time of individual 
buildings and the number of bankruptcies in the 
community in Part II. After a scenario hazard 
occurs, the damage state and the associated 
economic losses sustained by each building are 
recorded, and coupled with possible impeding 
factors and the results from Part I, the total 
recovery time and trajectory of each building are 
computed. The recovery process of the 
community can be obtained by aggregating the 
recovery states of individual buildings at every 
time step. More detailed information on each part 
will be provided in the following subsections.  
2.1. PART I: PRE-DISASTER INDIVIDUAL 
HOMEOWNERS’ DECISION MODEL  
Individual risk transfer decisions on one’s 
property depend not only on one’s expectation of 
the likelihood and consequences (i.e. financial 
losses in this study) of a disastrous event, but also 
on one’s risk attitudes, budget constraints, and 
post-disaster aid provided by the federal or local 
government. Let’s assume that the mth 
homeowner determines the optimal property 
insurance plan (with a coverage C and the 
premium zC for a given amount of the coverage) 
to protect the kth type of building based on the 
expected utility model:  
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E[𝑈𝑚(𝐶, 𝑘)] = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑈[𝑊𝑚 − 𝐸[𝐿𝑘|𝐼𝑀𝑖]
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝐶𝑃(𝐼𝑀𝑖, 𝐿𝑘 , 𝐷(𝑉𝑚)) − 𝑧𝐶
+ 𝐺𝐴(𝐼𝑀𝑖, 𝐿𝑘, 𝐶𝑃, 𝐺𝐴𝑚𝑎𝑥)]
+ (1 − ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
) 𝑈[𝑊𝑚 − 𝑧𝐶] 
 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (1) 
where M = the set of households in a community, 
K = the set of building types considered, n = the 
total number of intensity levels of a disastrous 
event, pi = the annual probability of occurrence of 
an event with the ith level of intensity (IMi), U(.) = 
the utility function, Wm = the initial wealth of the 
mth household, E[Lk|IMi] = the expected economic 
losses of the kth type of building induced by an 
event with the ith level of intensity (IMi), CP = the 
claim payment received from an insurance 
company following a disaster, D = the deductible, 
Vm = the value of the m
th property, z = the 
insurance premium per dollar coverage, C = 
insurance coverage, and GA = the amount of 
federal or local government assistance following 
a disaster.  
Based on the assumption that all individuals 
have the same level of probabilistic information 
on the likelihood and consequences of a disastrous 
event, an individual would determine the optimal 
amount of insurance coverage (Copt) and the 
associated premium by finding the value where 
𝑑𝐸[𝑈𝑚(𝐶,𝑘)]
𝑑𝐶
= 0 . Copt is the actual amount of 
coverage of the insurance plan the individual 
would purchase. 
Claim payment (CP) in the expected utilities 
is the amount paid by an insurance company to the 
insured when covered damage occurs. CP is 
defined as:  
𝐶𝑃
= {
                           0,    𝐸[𝐿𝑘|𝐼𝑀𝑖] ≤ 𝐷(𝑉𝑚)
𝐸[𝐿𝑘|𝐼𝑀𝑖] − 𝐷(𝑉𝑚),    𝐷(𝑉𝑚) < 𝐸[𝐿𝑘|𝐼𝑀𝑖] ≤ 𝐶
𝐶 − 𝐷(𝑉𝑚),    𝐸[𝐿𝑘|𝐼𝑀𝑖] > 𝐶
 
  (2) 
If the expected financial losses (E[Lk|IMi]) of the 
insured property are less than the deductible (D), 
the property owner is responsible for paying such 
losses and the insurance claim would not be 
initiated. If the financial losses exceed the 
deductible but are within the limit of the insurance 
plan (C), the insurance claim would be initiated 
and the insurance company covers the financial 
losses except the deductible. If the financial losses 
are greater than the coverage, the owner would 
receive the amount of money that is equal to the 
policy limit except the deductible.  
Another factor affecting homeowners’ 
decisions on insurance coverage is government 
assistance (GA) following a disaster. In the 
aftermath of a major disaster, the federal or local 
government provides the owners of non-insured 
and under-insured properties with financial 
assistance through grants, low-interest loans, or 
tax benefits to aid their post-disaster recovery. 
Some of empirical studies, however, have 
suggested that many individual homeowners do 
not anticipate receiving any federal disaster 
assistance prior to an event (Kunreuther et al., 
1978; Burby et al., 1991). Thus, it is assumed in 
this study that homeowners are not aware of 
federal assistance prior to an event and may not 
take it into account in making decisions while 
government assistance is considered in the post-
disaster recovery model that will be introduced in 
the next subsection.  
After determining the amount of insurance 
coverage of all properties in a community, their 
recovery processes can be modeled and 
aggregated in the post-disaster community-level 
recovery model.  
2.2. Post-Disaster Community-Level Recovery 
Model  
Following an extreme natural hazard event, the 
post-disaster recovery of a residential community 
(measured in terms of housing capacity) depends 
on the restoration activities of individual houses 
and is determined by their aggregated effects 
(Miles and Chang, 2007; Burton et al., 2018). The 
post-disaster recovery process of an individual 
house is affected by (a) its damage and economic 
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losses induced by a hazard event, (b) the property 
insurance plan purchased prior to an event as 
described in Section 2.1, (c) the ex-post 
government disaster assistance, (d) the 
household’s financial resources at hand, and (e) 
other variables. This subsection illustrates the 
Monte Carlo Simulation process that captures the 
temporal evolution of the recovery processes of 
individual houses with different pre-disaster and 
post-disaster situations and their aggregated 
effects on community resilience. This model 
places a particular focus on the role of catastrophe 
risk insurance in individuals’ financial resources 
following a disaster, recovery time determined 
based on their financial availability, as well as 
community resilience.  
The model begins by estimating the extent of 
damage and economic losses of individual 
buildings induced by an extreme event that occurs 
at t = t0. The damage states (DS) are divided into 
five states, namely, no damage (DS0), minor 
damage (DS1), moderate damage (DS2), severe 
damage (DS3), and destruction (DS4), that are 
consistent with those in HAZUS-MH (FEMA, 
2009). Economic losses associated with building 
damage states can be obtained from the 
relationship between damage and loss functions. 
The total repair time, Trepair, of a building is 
defined as the time to achieve the pre-event 
damage state (DS0 is assumed here) from the 
damage state (DSi) at t0.  
The time to initiate recovery activities is not 
immediately after the time of occurrence of an 
event (t0) but may be delayed due to several 
“impeding factors” defined in the REDiTM 
framework (Almufti and Willford, 2013). These 
factors include: (a) post-disaster inspection; (b) 
engineering mobilization and review/re-design; 
(c) financing; (d) contractor mobilization and bid 
process; (e) permitting; and (f) procurement of 
long-lead time components. The last impeding 
factor is not considered in this study because most 
of residential buildings do not require the 
procurement of long-lead time components, such 
as custom-made structural, mechanical, or 
architectural components. The detailed 
description of each impeding factor can be found 
in Almufti and Willford (2013).  
As introduced in the REDiTM framework, this 
paper considers three delay sequences of a 
damaged building due to different combinations 
of impeding factors. Each sequence provides its 
expected delay time (Tdelay,i) as follows:  
 Delay Sequence 1: inspection  financing 
(Tdelay,1 = Tinsp + Tfinancing)  
 Delay Sequence 2: inspection  engineering 
mobilization and review/redesign  
permitting (Tdelay,2 = Tinsp + Teng + Tpermitting)  
 Delay Sequence 3: inspection  contractor 
mobilization (Tdelay,3 = Tinsp + Tmob)  
The longest delay sequence controls the overall 
delay time. Thus, the total expected delay time is:  
  𝑇𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦 = max
𝑖
(𝑇𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦,𝑖), 𝑖 = 1,2,3              (3) 
This paper focuses on the Delay Sequence 1 
which is primarily triggered by the financing 
delay as it is closely associated with the pre-
disaster individual homeowners’ decisions about 
catastrophe insurance modeled in Section 2.1. As 
presented in Figure 1, if the owner has financial 
resources enough to repair his/her damaged 
property, there is no need to wait for insurance 
claim payment, and thus no “financing delay” is 
expected. If not, the owner should wait until the 
insurance company provides CP. Note that, in this 
stage, the expected financial losses (E[Lk|IMi]) can 
be replaced with the actual losses (L) induced by 
the hazard event by removing the associated 
uncertainties. If the owner has sufficient funds to 
cover the rest of the repair costs (L – CP), the 
delay time due to financing (Tfinancing) is governed 
by insurance claim delay (Tinsurance). If the 
available funds are insufficient to cover the 
remaining repair costs, the owner should wait 
until the government assistance becomes 
available. It is assumed that disaster assistance is 
provided to aid the recovery of properties only 
when they are damaged as a result of a 
presidentially-declared disaster. Government 
assistance (GA) is calculated as:  
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GA = {
L − CP, L − CP < 𝐺𝐴𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐺𝐴𝑚𝑎𝑥, L − CP ≥ 𝐺𝐴𝑚𝑎𝑥
 (4) 
Significant delays can occur in processing GA 
compensation as compared to the time that 
private/public insurance claim is paid. This delay 
(Tfinancing) is determined by the delay due to 
government assistance (TGA) and is substantially 
longer than Tinsurance in most cases. If the owner 
cannot guarantee financial availability to cover 
the remaining costs necessary to repair damaged 
properties at any point in time during this process, 
he/she would file for bankruptcy. It should be 
noted that, in this study, loan is not considered as 
an additional source of funding due to the 
complexity in incorporating individual’s credit 
history, market conditions, and different loan 
qualifications into the analysis.    
 
 
Figure 1. Financing delay sequence of a damaged 
building and the associated delay time  
 
The total recovery time of a building 
(Trecovery) is the sum of the total delay time (Tdelay) 
and the total repair time (Trepair). The total 
recovery times of all buildings are assumed to 
start immediately following a disaster at t0. As 
described in this subsection, each residential 
building has its own distinctive Trecovery,m value, 
which is dependent on the type of the building, the 
extent of damage sustained by the building and the 
associated economic losses, the financial 
availability and pre-disaster decisions about 
insurance coverage of an individual homeowner, 
and economic/political circumstances that may 
affect the amount and terms of the disaster 
assistance (Almufti and Willford, 2013). Since the 
post-disaster recovery of a residential community 
is measured in terms of housing capacity in this 
study, the recovery states of individual houses are 
aggregated at each point in time to capture the 
recovery process of the community.    
3. CASE STUDY 
3.1. Study region  
To assess quantitative impact of catastrophe risk 
insurance on the recovery processes of individual 
houses and subsequently on the resilience of a 
residential community, the framework introduced 
in the previous section is applied to seven census 
tracts located in Miami-Dade County, Florida. 
This site is selected for the application because (a) 
it is located in a hurricane-prone area and 
catastrophe insurance policy purchased prior to a 
disastrous event may play a significant role in the 
community resilience; and (b) it consists mostly 
of residential buildings (i.e., one-, two- and more-
story single-family and multi-unit dwellings).  
3.2. Simulation process 
Florida law requires homeowners living on 
mortgage to purchase property insurance policy 
which covers damage caused by wind. Thus, most 
of homeowners in the study region are assumed to 
purchase windstorm insurance prior to a disaster 
and choose coverages based on Eq. (1). While 
insurance premium discounts may be provided to 
the homeowners who adopt wind mitigation 
measures prior to an event or whose properties 
comply Florida building code, any types of pre-
disaster economic incentives or grants are not 
explicitly incorporated in the utility models. 
Generally, hurricane causes two types of damage: 
damage induced by high winds (mostly building 
damage including exterior components and 
cladding) which is covered by windstorm 
insurance and water damage (mostly content 
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damage) covered by flood insurance. This study 
focuses on windstorm-related damage and losses 
as well as windstorm insurance.  
Probabilistic descriptions of the variables 
used in the expected utility model are summarized 
in Table 1. The power utility function u(x) = xα, 
0<α≤1, is used in the study based on the 
assumption that individual homeowners have 
risk-averse or risk-neutral attitudes (Gollier, 
2003). The parameter, α, follows a truncated 
normal distribution with the mean value of 0.5 and 
Coefficient of Variation (COV) of 0.3. The annual 
probability of exceedance of a given wind speed 
for the site is obtained from FEMA (2009) and 
ASCE (2016), and is used to construct a site-
specific hazard curve. Loss function describing 
the expected losses of the kth type of building 
given the ith level of wind speed (E[Lk|IMi]) is 
modeled by a lognormal distribution with 
parameters obtained from HAZUS-MH (FEMA, 
2009). The annual income of the mth household 
(Im) is sampled from the distribution fitted to 
HAZUS-MH data which shows the percentage of 
population in each income class and subsequently 
used to compute the total wealth (Wm) based on 
their linear relationship. The relationship between 
annual income and total net wealth (Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2018) 
is obtained from linear regression analysis.  
 
Table 1. Probability distributions of the variables of 
the expected utility model  
Variable Distribution Type 
α Truncated normal 
Wm = f(Im) Linear regression 
E[Lk|IMi] Lognormal 
z Constant ($8.13) 
 
Based on data from five private insurance 
companies collected by Doherty et al. (2008), the 
range of windstorm insurance coverage (C) in 
Florida is assumed to be between $5,000 (in 2008 
dollars) and building value (which is obtained 
from HAZUS-MH) and the average premium per 
$1,000 of coverage, z, is $8.13. Note that most 
insurance policies do not fully cover the entire 
repair cost of a building, but require a deductible 
of 5- 10% of the building value.  
Hurricane Wilma in 2005 is selected as a 
scenario event to simulate the post-disaster 
recovery process of the study region. The peak 
gust wind speed during Hurricane Wilma was 
recorded as 111 mph. Damage state probabilities 
by building type are obtained from the HAZUS-
MH historical storm scenario analysis and then 
used to generate the damage state of each building 
and the associated economic losses. Economic 
losses include the structural and nonstructural 
repair costs caused by building damage and the 
costs related to relocation, income, rental and 
wage. Similar to the approach used in the 
HAZUS-MH hurricane model, repair time 
estimates (construction and clean-up time), Trepair, 
are modeled as a function of economic loss ratio, 
which is the ratio of the economic losses induced 
by a hazard event to the building value. The repair 
times corresponding to each building loss ratio 
(0%, 2%, 10%, 50%, and 100%) are obtained 
from HAZUS-MH (FEMA, 2003; FEMA 2009) 
as summarized in Table 2, and the repair time 
between two adjacent loss ratios can be computed 
using linear interpolation (FEMA, 2009).  
 
Table 2. Building repair time as a function of loss 
ratio (Unit: days)  
Occupancy 
Class  
Building Loss Ratio  
 0% 2% 10% 50% 100% 
Single family  0 2 30 90 180 
Multi family  0 5 30 120 240 
 
Three delay sequences of each damaged 
building are simulated to determine the total 
expected delay time, Tdelay. Each impeding factor 
is assumed to follow a lognormal distribution to 
incorporate substantial uncertainties in the 
factors. These lognormal parameters can be found 
in the REDiTM Framework (Almufti and Willford, 
2013). Although those parameters were originally 
developed for the conditions expected after a 
seismic event, they are slightly modified and used 
in this case study with the assumption that post-
earthquake delay times are equivalently 
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applicable to post-hurricane circumstances. As 
Hurricane Wilma was declared as a major disaster 
and individual assistance was provided to Miami-
Dade County, government assistance (GA) is also 
considered in the simulation process. It is 
assumed that grants are limited to $31,400 (in 
2012 dollars) per household (Kousky and 
Shabman, 2012). The total recovery time 
(Trecovery) is determined by summing the delay 
time (Tdelay) and the repair time (Trepair) and 
subsequently used for modeling community 
recovery process.  
3.3. RESULTS 
Following Hurricane Wilma, 67.29% of the 
buildings in the study area were undamaged 
(DS0), while 27.16%, 4.94%, 0.47%, and 0.14% 
of the buildings were in the damage states of DS1, 
DS2, DS3, and DS4, respectively. Figure 2 shows 
the histogram of the insurance coverages selected 
using Eq. (1). Based on this distribution and the 
actual losses sustained by the buildings, CPs and 
homeowners’ financial availability to cover the 
repair costs were determined, and subsequently, 
the delay times due to financing were computed 
as described in Section 2.2. The solid curve in 
Figure 3 represents the community recovery 
process (which is measured in terms of the 
number of residential buildings in the damage 
state of DS0) following Hurricane Wilma. Since 
0.9% (89 out of 9941) of the homeowners file for 
bankruptcies due to their insufficient financial 
resources for recovery activities, the fully 
recovered state of the community is 99.1%.  
The sensitivity analysis of government 
assistance is performed to assess its impact on 
individual’s financial status and community 
resilience after Hurricane Wilma. If ex-post 
disaster assistance is not available, 9.65% of the 
homeowners fail to pay for the repair costs and 
file for bankruptcy. This number is ten times 
greater than the number of bankruptcies when GA 
is provided. The recovery process of the 
community, when GA is not provided, is shown 
by the dashed line in Figure 3. As such, GA helps 
reduce the number of bankruptcies of low-income 
residents or homeowners whose properties are 
severely damaged, and thus affects the recovery 
curve of the community.    
 
 




Figure 3. Community recovery processes for two 
cases: government assistance is provided or not 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper proposes a framework that 
quantitatively assesses the impact of catastrophe 
insurance on community resilience by explicitly 
incorporating individual homeowner’s decisions 
on insurance coverage. The proposed simulation 
framework is applied to a small residential 
community in Miami-Dade County, Florida 
following Hurricane Wilma. The results indicate 
that the selected insurance coverage varies widely 
due to individual’s expectation of the likelihood 
and consequences of a disastrous event, risk 
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attitudes and budget constraints. Moreover, 
insurance may play a key role in improving 
community resilience if ex-post government 
assistance is not available or if substantial 
financial losses will occur following a disaster. 
Thus, providing affordable insurance plan is an 
important risk management strategy to protect a 
community and its residents against hazard events.  
The quantitative impact of insurance will 
provide guidance on how catastrophe risk 
insurance should be used in a broad resilience 
planning to achieve its long-term resilience goals. 
It will also provide a consistent quantitative 
measure for its comparison with other risk 
mitigation strategies (e.g. land use planning, 
incentives for proactive preventive measure, etc.) 
in a unified resilience framework.   
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